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The Recoverability of Unpaid Deposits in Contracts 
The Problem Stated; Vendor: "I am heinously unprovided" (Shakespeare) 
In a typical vendor and purchaser relationship, the vendor 
promises to convey a good title in consideration for the sale price, 
which includes a deposit, usually ten per centum of the sale price. 
The consolidated law on the payment of deposits is reasonably clear. 
However, there is a conflict of authority in the situation where a 
purchaser pays a deposit by negotiable instrument which is subsequently 
dishonoured, or more fundamentally when the prescribed deposit pay-
ment is not made at all. The extent of the vulnerability of the non-
defaulting vendor to recover the unpaid deposit has, surprisingly, 
been judicially examined in only a few reported cases. 
The object of this paper is to attempt to synthesize the case 
law as a distortion or legitimate development of contractual 
principles, and to suggest a rationalisation of the law. 
1 Johnson v. Jones 
This is the most recent decision to add to the confusion. The 
appellant agreed to purchase from the respondent a property, con-
ditional upon raising mortgage finance. The learned Magistrate and 
McMullin J. respectively held that the appellant was in breach of 
her contract, presumably for failure to make reasonable efforts to 
secure finance, although the case is not reported on this point. 
The appellant only paid $1,000 in respect of the $2,000 deposit 
required by the contract. She explained to the vendor's agent that 
1. L1972} NZLR 313 In Monigatti v. Minchin 32 MCR 67 Luxford S.M. 
held that in law an unpaid deposit was recoverable. 
'• LLINGTON 
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it would be necessary to sell some shares to make up the outstanding 
$1,000, to which the agent replied that this was "all right". Upon 
repudiation the vendor claimed the $1,000 balance of deposit. In a 
considered judgment, Mr Mullin J. found for the repudiating purchaser, 
holding that if a vendor, having stipulated for the payment of a 
deposit which would have been forfeited had it been paid, failed to 
collect it before he rescinds or accepts the purchaser's rescission, 
he cannot subsequently sue for the deposit. 
McMullin J. 's decision is based on three reasons for preventing 
recovery:-
(a) The parties had decided for themselves by their choice of 
words that, upon default the vendor, "may rescind this 
2 
contract of sale and thereupon all moneys theretofore 
paid shall be forfeited to the vendor as liquidated 
damages". 
3 
(b) "The very nature of a deposit is such that before it can 
be forfeited it must first be paid". 
(c) Even rescission de futuro does not "entitle the respondent 
to sue for the recovery and forfeiture of something which 
he could have insisted upon being in his hands at the time 
• h h I , • .,4 he rescinded or elected to accept t e pure aser s rescission . 
Each reason is certainly worthy of individual analysis. With 
respect it is submitted that McMullin J. 's interpretation of the argu-
ment clause overlooks what in fact the parties did agree. There was 
2. At 317 138 the supposedly vital word "theretofore" is emphasized 
but is incorrectly written as "therefore" (sic) 
3. P317 110 
4. P318 18 
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not a bland agreement that "all moneys theretofore paid " only were 
to be forfeited . This , by itself , is misleading , it is only an 
example of one of the vendor ' s rights . The parties specifically pn0ieJ 
that option as being "without prejudice to (the vendor ' s) other 
remedies 11 • 5 The r e is no l imitation to the generality of rights 
accruing upon default by the vendor . The contractual right to bring 
an action to recover the unpaid deposit , is neither extinguished nor 
modified by the intention of the parties as manifested in the contract . 
No . . . 
'1!he remedy 1s circumscribed . It is submitted that the vendor is not 
precluded from maintaining an action for the unpaid deposit by the 
terms of the contract , con trary to which McMullin J . decided; but 
that it is merely one instance of a remedy enhanced by the unlimited 
nature of the rights available contractually and encompassed within 
them . 
The second reason advanced by McMullin J . is that the theoretical 
nature and function of a deposit is such that it cannot be forfeited 
unless it is paid . This reason naturally , determines the lifespan of 
any action for an unpaid deposit . Logically stemming from McMullin 
J .' s reason is the proposition that , should a purchaser contractually 
promise to pay a deposit , as part of the total consideration for the 
vendor ' s mutual promise , but does not in fact do so, he is freed from 
any obligation in that respect . The answer to this issue, it is 
submitted , lies in the evolutionary nature of the deposit . Admittedly 
the vendor could not recover the full purchase price and no authority 
is needed for stating that the forfeiture of instalments amounts to 
a penalty . But a deposit is different. It has been recognised that 
a deposit is conceptually distinct from other payments ever since the 
reformative doctrine propounded in Howe v . Smith 6 . 
5 . p315 , line 1 
6 . (1884) 27 CL . D. 89 approved 1n Sprague v . Booth (1909) A. C. 576 , 58 0 
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"A deposit is not merely a prepayment of the purchase money , it is also an earnest to bind the bargain , a guarantee for the performance of the contract creating by the fear of its forfeiture a motive in the payer to perfonn the rest of the contract ". ? 
All three members of the Co urt of Appeal attributed to the 
term "deposit " a clear meaning that upon repudiation it is to be 
forfeited . However , they were confined to the facts before them 
where the deposit was in fact paid . Why should a restrictive inter-
pretation be superimposed on the definition of "deposit " as to 
exclude a promise to pay a deposit? McMullin J . reasons that " there 
can be no forfeiture or fear of it until the deposit has first been 
paid 11 • 8 He reasons that you cannot lose something you have not given . 
It is submitted this premise is inaccurate . A deposit should , 
because of its special , intrinsic nature as a compensatory mechanism , 
be automatically forfeited to the vendor on default whether paid or 
payable , because it serves as 
"A guarantee that the purchaser means business ' and if there is a case in which a deposit is rightly and properly forfeited it is ... when a man enters into a contract to buy real property without taking the trouble to consider whether he can pay for it or not " 9 
Further , in the typical vendor/purchaser contract , it is a pro-
mised right which has conditionally accrued , subject only to the 
vendor ' s ability to execute his consideration , (default obviates the 
need to convey , of course) , and therefore the right has been given 
and may be lost accordingly . 
McMullin J . states that , "it can hardly be said to be a deposit 
until it has been deposited 11 • 10 Why does the identity of a deposit 
only crystallize when it is paid? The deposit , as a right , does not 
6. continued .. 
and applied in ew Zealand , see , Martin v . Finch (1923) NZLR 570 
7 . At 101. 
8 . p318 , line 28 
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exist in suspended animation. Upon the signing of the contract, 
it is created as a security for the vendor. He has the right to 
retain or obtain it. Presumably a vendor can show that he is 
entitled to an unpaid deposit by showing that the purchaser agreed 
to that. If the contract vests property of the deposit and 
(eventually) possession then, subject to an ability to convey, 
failure to actually pay, upon rescission de futuro is not to the 
vendor's detriment; the right having already accrued. Are these 
conditions satisfied in Johnson? 
It is submitted that the vendor's security lies in general 
property of the deposit, evidenced by the contract, which entitles 
him ultimately to actual possession. It is a credit calculation. 
The promise to pay a deposit is a guarantee that the contract will 
be performed. 
The deposit is enforceable if supported by executed consideration. 
Usually payment is execution. However, there is a recognized 
exception to this principle. It is stated in Ruddenklau v. Charles-
worth 11 by Sir John Salmond:-
"In an executory contract in which by the express terms of the contract the purchase money or any part thereof is made payable on a fixed day, not being the agreed day for the com-pletion of the contract by conveyance (i)n all such cases the purchase money or such part thereof becomes on the day so fixed for its payment a debt immediately recoverable by the vendor irrespective of the question whether a conveyance has been executed and notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser may have repudiated the contract".12 
9. Soper v. Arnold (1889) 14 App Cas 429, 435 per Lord Macnaghten 
10. p.318, line 29 
11. (1925) NZLR 161, 164-165, upheld an appeal (1925) NZLR 171 and quoted with approval in McDonald v. Dennys Laschelles (1933) 48 C.L.R. 457, 476 
12. See Reynolds v. Fury (1921) V.L.R. 1, 17, Ruwald v. Halling 2 7 S. R. ( SW) 3 3 4 
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It is respectfully submitted that this is too wide . The 
recoverable payments could include instalments , but it is contended 
that t he principle that the deposit is a debt " irrespective of the 
question of whether a conveyance has been executed " is correct . 
The vendo r bargains for the deposit , it is given by the purchaser 
as evidence o f good faith . Of course when the deposit is promised 
to the vendor he assumes an obligation not to sell the land to any 
other person . He suffers a detriment in being restrained in his 
dealings . The payment of the deposit is not conditional upon corn-
pletion of the contract . That follows from the nature of a deposit 
as a gua rantee . But also the agreement to pay the deposit is 
given in consideration of the conrtract not in consideration for a 
conveyance . As the vendor agreed to sell and would have but for the 
purchaser ' s default the consideration is fully executed , and the right 
is vested before rescission , as it is created contemporaneously upon 
the formation of the contract . Forfeiture of the deposit means that 
the vendor does not return it to the purchaser , it does not mean that 
the purchaser must surrender it for he has only a contingent interest 
in it fructifying only upon the vendor ' s default . The vendor has 
property . kl h 13 · h f l . b In Stoc oser v . Jonson in t e context o a c aim y 
a purchaser that the forfeiture of his deposit amounted to a penalty , 
Denning , L . J . said :-
"In the present case , however , the seller is not seeking to exact a penalty . He only wants to keep money which already belongs to him ". 
It is submitted this is exactly the case but Denning L . J . continues : -
"The money was handed to him in part payment of the purchase price and , as soon as it was paid , it belonged to him absolutely ". 
13 . (1954) 128 476 488 - 489 
- 7 -
Why must it first be paid to create a right in the vendor? 
The vendor is not seeking restitution. His claim is to a right 
which he was given, based upon executed consideration. In Johnson 
the purchaser does not wish to pursue her contract but seek 
relief from the consequences of her default. Ostensibly, McMullin J. 
discusses this issue. He adopts a statement from the judgment of 
14 Dixon J. in McDonald v. Dennys Lascelles Ltd. Unfortunately the 
learned judge incorrectly cites it. Upon rescission in Australia 
and New Zealand: 15 
"Both parties are merely discharged from the further per-formance of the contract but rights are not divested or dis-charged which have already been conditionally (sic) acquired". 
Although not cited in Johnson, Dixon J. continued:-
"Rights and obligations which arise from the partial execution of the contract and causes of action which have accrued from its breach alike continue unaffected". 
Dixon J. actually stated that, "rights are not divested or 
discharged which have already been unconditionally acquired". From 
this error, between conditionally acquired and unconditionally 
acquired rights McMullin J. adduces that the vendor is not entitled:-
"To sue for the recovery and forfeiture of something which he could have insisted upon being in his hands at the time when he rescinded or elected to accept the purchaser's rescission".16 
He clearly states that possession is essential. It is respectfully submitted it is irrelevant. Possession is only an additional security 
14 . (1933) 48 C.L.R. 457, 477 
15 . White v. Ross /1960/ NZLR 247 
16. P318, Line 9 
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The vendor has property. Possession need not be coextensive with 
property. A pledgee has possession without property; a vendor may 
have property without possession. The nature of the deposit as a 
security is that it is owned or owed subject to the vendor's uni-
lateral default. Non-performance of the payment of a security 
against non-performance does not affect the right to that payment as 
it is bargained for and by making the contract it vests property, 
enforceable as a debt, irrespective of conveyance. It has legal 
personality as a debt. By his default the purchaser loses the right 
to restitution and incurs a contractual liability. 
McMullin J. attempts to mollify the plight of the vendor by 
stating:-
"In short, a vendor who fails to get in the amount of the 
deposit loses the benefit of a possible windfall".17 
The vendor would argue that he would never have entered into the con-
tract without the deposit being paid or eventually payable. In 
Johnson the appellant agreed to pay the remainder of the deposit to 
the land agent. She asked for a concession and was given one; 
this has been held fatal to the vendor. The vendor cannot plead 
estoppel as it does not give a cause of action. The vendor may have 
an action against the agent. An agent has no implied authority to 
18 sell on extended terms or to give credit instead of obtaining an 
immediate cash payment. 19 
In Johnson it is difficult to r e concil e the partie s' inte ntions 
and the result. The case is, it is submitted, an example of the 
V · 1 . d J h d . . d . . f 20 h h . d ery ev1 Horr1 ge . a in min in Dewar v. Minto t w en e sa1 :-
17. p317, line 54 
18. Boyd v. O'Connor (1923) VLR 608 
19. Breese v. Lindsay (1882) 8 V.L.R. (E) 98 
20. .(1912} 2KB 373, 387 
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"The defendant could not put himself in a better position by refusing to pay the deposit than if t he deposit had in fact b een paid". 
A Direct Conf l ict of Authority 
In Johnson McMullin J . prefixes his reasoning by mentioning a 
direct conflict of authority . He refers to Dewar v . Mintoft 
in which Horridge J . very summarily allowed the recovery of an 
21 unpaid deposit and to Lowe v . Hope in which PennycuickJ ., in 
refusing to follow Dewar denies this possibility . Unfortunately 
Farrant v . Leburn22 decided in the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia and in which Lowe was rejected was not cited in Johnson . 
23 Very re cently in Brien v . Dwyer the Court of Appeal of New South 
Wales in an obiter statement approved Dewar . In none of these 
authorities was the early English case , decided by a court comprising 
Lord Campbell C. J ., Coleridge , Erle and Crompton J.J. of Ockenden 
24 v . Henly referred to or considered . 
In Oc kenden a condition of sale was that the successful bidder 
should "forthwith pay into the hands of the auctioneer a deposit 
20 per cent on the purchase money, and sign the agreement " and 
11 If the purchaser shall fail to comply with the conditions , the 
deposit shall be actually forfeited to the vendor". 
The reason for this particular type of wording was to escape 
the then possibility that on default the vendor could not forfeit 
the deposit as there was no specific provision to this effect . The 
defendant purchaser did not pay the deposit or complete the purchase. 
21 . /196~/ 3 All ER 605 
22 . Ll970} W.A . R. 179 
23 . Unreported 373/74 16 December 1976 N.S.W . Court of Appeal 
24. (1858) 27 LJQB 361 
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It was held that the vendor could recover , in addition to the 
deposit , only so much of the difference between the two prices and 
of the expenses of the resale , as the deposit did not recover . Lord 
Campbell C . J . states that , " the seller having obtained a right to 
the forfeited deposit " could claim it . He also states that , 
"a pecuniary deposit upon a purchase is to be considered as a pay-
ment in part of the purchase money and not a mere pledge ". One 
hundred and eleven years later PennycuickJ . in Lowe characterised 
25 the deposit as a "contractual pledge ". It is submitted that the 
deposit is not a contractual pledge , it is a contractual entity 
paid for by the vendor ' s promise . By stating that the vendor had 
obtained " a right" to the unpaid deposit , the Court must necessarily 
have seen this " right " as surviving repudiation and therefore vested 
before it . The case is of limited importance in that the judgment 
is very brief and unclear , but it is the first case historically 
concerned with unpaid deposits . 
I · f 20 .d . h 1· f n Dewar v . Minto t Horri ge J . in tree ines out o a 
lengthy judgment , held that a defendant should not be able to put 
himself in a better position by refusing to pay a deposit than if the 
deposit had in fact been paid, when it would have been forfeited . 
This case has been swept under the mat in England (Lowe) and New 
Z 1 ( h ) II • • 1 ,. 26 ea and Jonson contrary to princip e It contains no refer-
ence to principles of rescission and is more a statement that a 
purchaser should not "profit " from his default than a reasoned 
decision . However, it is submitted the result is correct . It 
stresses the inviolable nature of contracts and states that it 
would be unjust and oppressive for the purchaser to obtain more than 
25. p608 E 
26. p609 C 
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he could have obtained had the contract been performed . 
21 Lowe v . Hope was followed by McMullin J . in Johnson . In 
this case the defendant paid only a small part of the deposit and 
failed to complete the purchase . PennycuickJ . held that once the 
vendor had rescinded the contract there was no outstanding obliga-
tion of the purchase in respect of which the vendor could be entitled 
to be protected by a pledge . 
" The vendor having elected to bring the contract to an end by rescissio n , is not entitled to insist on the performance of t h e contract in relation to the deposit . This is admittedly so , insofar as the deposit bears the character of part of the unpaid purc hase money" . 27 
The initial criticism is that rescission does not affect the 
right of the vendor. Secondly it is a deceptive characterisation 
to label the deposit as "unpaid purchase money" . The deposit must 
be distinguished from instalments . 
PennycuickJ . continues :-
" In the present case the vendor has elected for rescission and he is not entitled , as a preliminary (sic : to) the rescission , to obtain an order for payment which he could only obtain if he were insisting on performance of the contract " . 
It is respectfully submitted that the vendor need not perform 
the additional function of requiring an order for payment as the 
right to payment clearly exists and that it is not one he can only 
28 obtain by performing the contract . 
In 5 New Zealand University Law Review 292 , 293 Mr B. Coote 
rationalises the conflict between Dewar and Lowe for historical reasons . 
He would appear to accept what Swift J . explained in Harold Wood 
B . k . 29 ric Co . v . Ferris : -
" It seems to me that ... it was not appropriate in the Chancery Division , to put into one order an order rescinding the contract and an order providing for the assessment of damages for breach of contract". 
27. p608D 
28 . p609E 
29 . /19357 lK . B. 613 , 615 
• 
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Dewar was decided in the Kings Bench , while Lowe was a Chancery 
case. Coote states:-
"The idea that discharge for breach terminates a contract as to the future only, and leaves intact rights accrued up to the point of termination, is a common law invention and one which it would seem, some Chancery lawyers at least have never accepted". 
A further expression of this reticence is demonstrated in 
Horsler v . Zorro 30 where Mega[y J . says, in England :-
"For long the law students' adage has been : ' You can ' t both rescind and claim damages '". 
15 This is usually incorrect in New Zealand : White v . Ross . 
Recently in Hunt v. Hyde 31 Casey J . held that "rescission" may 
be ab initio or de future . He decided that a clause which enables 
a vendor to rescind whereupon all moneys "theretofore paid " to the 
vendor shall be forfeited, does not limit the damages which may be 
claimed against a party who breaks off the contract altogether. 
The clause is identical with that in Johnson when an opposite con-
clusion was reached. 
It is submitted that in Lowe , PennycuickJ . applied principles 
of rescission not acceptable in New Zealand . Pennycuick J . cites 
with approval Williams on Vendor and Purchaser (4th edn) at pl006 
where the effects of rescission ab initio are outlined . In 91 
Law Quarterly Review 337 Mr M. Albeny Q. C. in an article titled , 
"Mr Cyprian William's Great Heresy" states that Mr William did not 
understand the fundamental principle of the law of contract. 
Assuming that PennycuickJ . is incorrect for present purposes , what 
obligations remain payable if rescission is de future? It has been 
in three cases both decided by Full Courts , i.e . 
30 . /1975/ l All E . R. 584 , 595 
Reynolds 12 v. Fury 
31 . /19767 2 ZLR 453 . See also Kinleyside v . Irwin LI96~7 W. A.R . 169 , 
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Ruwald v. Halling12 and Ruddenclau v . Charlesworth11 that although 
the vendor had not executed a conveyance, he was entitled to sue 
before completion inasmuch as the contract fixed a definite date 
for the payment and did not postpone it until completion or until 
after completion. As long as the payment of the deposit is not made 
a condition concurrent with a conveyance the vendor :-
., can recover as a debt all instalments of purchase money payable prior to the due date of the balance of the purchase money". 
The deposit is paid as part of the purchase price . It is pay-
able because the vendor assumes potential positive obligations 
towards the vendor. After the exchange of contracts the purchaser 
requires an equitable interest in the land . It is submitted that the 
payment of the deposit is consideration for this equitable right . 
The promise to pay having been given , it constrains the vendor as 
he cannot sell the land to another person . If the vendor cannot 
convey then the purchaser may recover damages and his deposit , 
Warring v. Brentna11 32 . 
In Farrant v. Leburn Wickham J . held that an unpaid deposit was 
recoverable as a debt after rescission de futuro . The learned judge 
refuse J to follow Lowe. He rejects that decision , and consequently 
the reason which has resurfaced in IIorsler , as relying on rescission 
ab initio which is not the law in Australia or cw Zealand , unless 
it is the irresistible inference . Because of the fundamental mis-
apprehension in Lowe Wickham J . declares himself free to look at the 
matter anon. He restates the McDonald passage from Dixon J . ' s 
~oates v . Sarich f1964J W. A. R. 2 Two rare examples where he court nas held rescission to be ab initio on the contract are : Pitt v . Curotta (1931) 31 S . R. (NSW) 477 and Jeeves Ltd v . Rogers0936) 36 SR ( SW) 430 cf Smith v . Fennell L1931/ GLR 161 
32 . 1975 2 ZLR 401 
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judgment and examines its criteria:-
"The question here is whether the promise to pay by the 
purchaser has given rise to an unconditional debt as distinct 
from a claim for unliquidated damages for breach of an 
executory contract".33 
The answer is seen in the nature of the deposit. It masquerades 
perhaps as part of the purchase price but it differs as it is not 
conditional upon completion and is the absolute property of the 
seller subject to its return if the vendor cannot make good title. 
The plaintiff's right to the balance of the deposit in this 
sense was not only vested prior to rescission but it was 
vested upon an executed consideration and can be 
in debt or upon an indebitatus assumpsit". Turner v . Bladin 
(1951) 82 C.L.R. 463, 474.34 
The action for recovery of a deposit is an action at law based 
on indebitatus assumpsit: Zsadony v . Pizer . 35 There is no question 
of total failure of consideration before rescission as the plaintiff ' s 
right to the balance was vested before rescission. 
23 Very recently in Brien v . Dwyer in the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal Hutley J.A. said obiter, in a statement in which Moffitt P. 
and Samuels J.A. agreed, 
"If Dewar v . Mintoft is rightly decided , which I believe it is , 
the vendor can sue for the deposit even after rescinding. 
However , Pennywick J. refused to follow it in Lowe v . llope and 
if this is right the vendor could only recover anyLhing by 
proof of the amount of his damages - a most material detriment". 
The law on the unpaid deposit is quite unclear . Not since 1858 
has a Full Court been presented with the issue . Because of the 
unpred ictability and uncertainty at the moment , it can only be hoped 
that some indefatigable litigant will eventually take this issue to 
our own Court of Appeal to be definitively resolved. 
33 . pl83 , line 21 
34. pl84 , line 16 
35 , (1955) V. L . R. 496, 502 
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Is Payment of a Deposit a Condition Precedent to the Formation 
of a Contract? 
This issue was never considered in Johnson or Lowe . The Courts 
always assumed there was a contract on which rights had been constructed . 
However , in Myton v . Schwab- Morris 36 contracts were exchanged , and 
the buyer ' s cheque for the deposit was subsequently dishonoured . 
The ve ndors maintained that the payment of the deposit was a condition 
precedent . If this was correct contractual relations were precluded 
from being established . Goulding J . held that : 
"The vendor in the normal case never intends to be bound by 
the contract without having the deposit " . 
It is submitted this is incorrect . A deposit is not necessary to the 
validity of a contract of sale and a vendor cannot require a deposit 
in the absence of any stipulation , Perry v . Suffields Ltd 37 . In 
Stembridge v . Morrison 38 in the New Zealand Court of Appeal , Stout C. J . 
and Sim J . believed : -
" that the payment of the deposit is a condition precedent to 
the purchaser being entitled to obtain a contract" . 39 
Woodhouse J . in Watson v . Healy Lands Ltd 40 said in the contract of 
a dispute over the payment of a deposit:-
"In my opinion it is clear ... the deposit is a condition 
precedent to the purchaser being entitled to any contract at 
all ". 
This is inconsistent with an earlier statement41 that : -
"Even if the contract had been rescinded before any payment 
by the plaintiff , I think it likely that the defendant here 
would still have been entitled to sue directly for the unpaid 
deposit" . 
3 6 . ( 19 7 4) 1 Al 1 E . R . 3 2 6 
37 . (1916) 2 C . L . 187, 191 
38. 16 G. L.R. 210 
39 . At 212 
40 . f1965} NZLR 511 , 517 
41. At 516 
• 
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The situation where a deposit is deferred by consent is the 
same as that when no deposit is made and it could not be said in 
the earlier case there is no contract. 
speaking for the Court of Appeal said:-
In Brien Huntley J.A. 
"If there is an exchange of counterparts without the payment of a deposit, a contract comes into existence. I cannot accept as sound that portion of the judgement of Goulding J. in Myton v. Schwa~-Morris in which His Lordship held that the payment of a deposit was a condition precedent to the contract coming into existence".42 
To create a condition precedent it is highly desirable that 
express words should be used. It is concluded that a deposit is 
not usually a condition precedent to the existence of a contract, 
although the parties are always free to contract for this. It 
follows that a deposit need not be paid on the signing of the 
contract , Chard v. Willett. 43 
The Recovery of an Unpaid Deposit - a Penalty? 
In the Law of Restitution Goff and Jones state at 349 :-
"Equity has always refused to countenance the exaction of penalties not yet paid ". 
The defaulting purchaser could argue that the recovery of an unpaid 
deposit is tantamount to a penalty . But Goff and Jones qualify 
their initial statement by stating that :-
"Relief should in any event be refused to a claimant who has wilfully broken his contract" .44 
It is difficult to see how a deposit can become a penalty 
because a vendor has not collected it earlier or because he graciously 
gave the purchaser a concession before he broke his contract . It is 
42. At 4 
43 . (1933) St . RQd 182 See also , Hartl v . Gibbons /1974/ Qd . R.9, Re Lockwood ' s Caveat /1973/ Qd . R. 373 What is a deposit? In Bramich v. Patmore (1920) 17 Tas L . ~ . 57 a "down payment " 
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not unconscionible to make a profit even out of default. 45 It is 
submitted that the unpaid deposit could only be a penalty if it 
was of such proportion as to be unfair and oppressive. In Codot 
46 Developments Limited v . Potter & Cherry Wild C.J., adopting the 
view of the majority in Stockloser held that a paid deposit of 
$10,000 in a contract price of $20 ,000 was a penalty . The reasonable 
basis is that expressed by Lord Hailsham C.C . delivering the advice 
of the Privy Council in Lingi Plantations Ltd v . Jagatheesan :- 47 
"There is nothing unusual or extortionate in a 10 % deposit on 
a contract for the sale of land , and if the sale price is over 
$3,000,000 the deposit will be over $300 ,000". 
In general, unless the unpaid deposit was wielded oppressively 
because of its sheer size in relation to the contract price it is con-
tended it will not amount to a penalty . 
The Position of Negotiable Instruments and IOUs 
In Johnson McMullin J . mentions Hodgens v . Keon 48 and Hinton v . 
49 Sparkes as cases where a claim for an unpaid deposit had been 
sustained . In Hinton , instead of depositing the E50 deposit , the 
was said to be a deposit . In 
Rental Canada et al 32 D. L.R. 
not to be a deposit as was an 
Mitchenall Estates Ltd (1965) 
Trembath 8 M. C. R. 153 . 
44 . At 349 
Bradley Bras (Oshawa) Ltd v . A to Z 
(3d) 521 a "down payment" was held 
"initial payment" in Galbraith v . 
2 Q. B. 473 . See also Tims v . J. & L . 
45. See Windsor Securities Ltd v . Loneldal Ltd and Lester , The Times , 
10 September 1975 plO where Counsel urged that the vendors were 
to be congratulated rather than consoled regarding the effects 
of his client ' s breach ! In Vernon v . Godfrey (unreported A 1762/74 
11 September 1975 Auckland S . C. Coates J . ) the learned judge held 
the purchaser liable for an unpaid deposit of $7 , 000 in a total 
contract price of $13 ,4 00. It is submitted the unpaid deposit 
amounted to a penalty in this case . 
46 . (unreported 23 November 1976 A 186/76 Wellington S . C. , Wild C. J . ) 
47. (unreported 7 December 1971, Privy Council Appeal No . 22 of 1970 
Lord Hailsham L . C., Lord Hodson , Lord Cross of Chelsea) 
4 8 • {18 9 4} 2 I. R • 6 5 7 
49. (1868) L.R . 3 C . P . 161 
• 
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purchaser gave an IOU for the amount . He promised to pay the money 
the next day . In argument it was put that , " the plaintiff therefore , 
was clear l y entitled to recover the sum independently of the 
agreement". Th . d . 11 . d 50 is was accepte . Bov1 C. J . sa1 :-
"Treating the IOU as money , the deposit was in the hands of the 
vendor . Assuming that to be the state of things could the 
purchaser have recovered back the li50? Clearly not ". 
· 11 h h . d · · 51 W1 es J . t e ot er JU ge is more precise . 
"The only question is , whether the vendor is to be in any 
worse position because the deposit was not paid down at the 
time . I can no t see why the rights of the vendor should be 
affected by the purchaser ' s having committed two breaches of 
contract instead of one . All doubt , however , is removed by 
the giving of the IOU . If the money had been paid , the purchaser 
clearly could not have recovered it back ". 
The IOU is treated as a further acknowledgment of the purchaser ' s 
pre- existing susceptibility for the deposit . The court sees the 
right as surviving repudiation . The question is whether the IOU 
provides a further ground of liability or merely compounds the action 
for a debt . In Hodgens the Court of Exchequer , affirmed by the Irish 
Court of Appeal , held that an action lay at the suit of the auctioneer 
against the purchase for the amount of the IOU for a deposit . Palles 
C.B . said :-
" On the other hand , where the agreement (to accept the IOU) is 
without such consent (from the vendor) there can be no 
extinguishment of the obligation to the vendor to pay the 
deposit as provided by the conditions ". 52 
McMullin J . concludes in Johnson that "the IOU o f itself represented 
an undertaking by the purchaser to pay the amount f or which it was 
given and so constituted a separate head of liability between the 
auctioneer and the purchaser ". 53 
so . At 165 
51. At 166 
52. At 660 
53 . p318 line 23 
• 
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A promisory note of acknowledgment of debt 
cause of action ; as A1brson B. said in Porter v . 
gives an independent 
54 Cooper 
"An admi s sion of a certain sum being due in respect of a demand for which an action would lie , is evidence sufficient to s upport a c ourt on an action stated ". 
On this basis , the purchasers ' statement in Johnson to the effect that 
she intended to pay the remaining $1 , 000 after she had sold some shares , 
would give a good cause of action . 
55 In Pol l way Ltd v . Abdullah the English Court of Appeal 
recently held that an agent (auctioneer) had a valid claim against 
the defendant on a dishonoured cheque against the defendant for the 
"very short reason they were never the holders of the cheque and 
cannot sue on it ". It was also said:-
" It is true that the auctioneers by reason of condition 3 
received t h e deposit as agents for the vendors and are account-able to them for its proceeds . That accounting is a matter 
between the vendo rs and the auctioneers ". 
The purchaser was under an obligation to honour the cheque by virtue 
of the contract between him as the drawer of the cheque and the 
auctioneer as the named payee . The vendors consideration was the 
ability to complete the sale , if necessary . The vendor ' s right to 
rescind and to claim damages was not disputed . 
for the Court of Appeal said : -
Roskill L . J . speaking 
"I am unable to follow on what principle of law the vendor ' s 
subsequent rescission (of the contract with the purchaser) 
can operate to divest the auctioneers of their already 
accrued cause of action" . 
Presumably the vendor would have had this right if the cheque was 
made out to him as payee . Roskill L.J . concluded : -
"For my part I am not prepared to accept that in a case such as the present an agent who receives a cheque made payable to him-self in the course of a transaction effected on behalf of his principal obtains no enforceable right against the drawer of the cheque ". 
54. 1 C . M. & R . 3 8 7 , 3 9 5 
55 . /1974/ 2 All E . R. 381 , 383 
• 
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This , it is submitted is the correct position. Is there any 
differenc e between a dishonoured cheque and the failure to pay at 
all? Wh e n a c heque is accepted in payment of a debt , it operates 
to exti n guish the debt , subject to the condition that if upon due 
presentatio n the cheque is not paid the original debt revives just 
as if the cheque had never been given ; Charles v. Blackwell ; 56 
57 Cohen v . Hale . It has been submitted that the unpaid deposit 
creates a debt i mmediately owing and recoverable . If this is 
correc t , then non- payment and dishonoured payment are on the same 
foot i ng . In Pollway the vendors would eventually recover their 
unpaid depo sit . Their agents have successfully recovered it from 
the purchaser for them . Agency is merely an instrumentality . The 
vendor recovers . 
In Farrant v . Leburn Wickham J . allowed the vendor, as opposed 
to his agent , to recover an unpaid deposit on a dishonoured cheque . 
The cheque was payable to the vendor ' s agents . Defence counsel 
submitted in argument that the plaintiff could not sue on the cheque 
for the reason that the plaintiff was not the payee and , if he 
became a holder at all , did not become a holder until after the 
cheque had been dishonoured . 
Wickham J . in concluding that where a deposit was payable and 
was not in fact or was paid by dishonoured cheque , it amounted to a 
cause of action as a debt and as : -
"This determines the case in favour of the plaintiff it is not 
necessary for me to deal with the cause of action on the cheque 
or the defence thereto , about which I say nothing , either on 
the law or on the facts" . 58 
In England under Pollway only the vendor ' s agent would have had 
an action on the cheque . It is submitted that although the final 
result is the same , both vendors obtain the unpaid deposit , they do 
so for different reasons . Farrant is indiscriminate in that the 
Plaintiffs right is not tied to an action on the cheque itself . 
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The cheque is almost seen as extrinsic evidence . The right is to 
the deposit which is a recoverable debt in Farrant . In Pollway the 
right is to an action of a cheque given to extinguish a debt . 
In Hodgens v. Keon the auctioneer-agent had a right to sue on 
the IOU . It was made out to him. It is submitted that either the 
agent or the principal may sue to recover the deposit as a debt . 
They may sue in the alternative but both cannot succeed for that 
would amount to double liability. Usually the agent should bring 
the action as he is bound to the principal anyway. On a cheque that 
has been dishonoured the right may be seen in two perspectives . It 
is a debt immediately recoverable and there is a specific and 
alternative action on the cheque by the payee. 
The Principles Involved 
Coete in 5 New Zealand University Law Review 292 , 294 states 
that in Johnson McMullin J . has taken the view that the vendor ' s 
rights to retain a deposit are " something alien to a possessory lien " 
which is "entirely consistent with McMullin J . ' s preference for 
Lowe v . Hope. 
"The essential question then becomes whether a possessory 
rule used to justify retention of the deposit is an exception 
to restitutio in integrum should be used to deny recovery 
as an exception to the quite different rule that rights 
accruing before termination should remain enforceable thereafter". 
It is respectfully submitted that the essential question is whether 
the contract vests property in the deposit in the vendor. If it 
does , possession does not affect the right . ot all rights survive 
termination but a right given absolutely (subject to the infrequent 
occasion when the vendor has not the ability to convey) or a right 
substantiated by executed consideration remains enforceable . 
56. 2 C . P . D. 151 , 158 
57 . 3 Q . B . o . 171 
58. pl85 , Line 8 
• 
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In Munro v. Pedersen 59 Sir John Salmond said in the context 
of an action for the refund of a deposit :-
"When a contract becomes impossible without the default of either party, both parties are discharged from their obligations to further performance, but moneys already paid under the contract before it becomes impossible cannot be recovered, and moneys already payable before that date remain payable " 
The alleged justification for the rule that , if a parLy binds 
himself by contract absolutely to do a thing , he cannot escape 
liability by pleading impossibility, is that a party to a contract 
can always guard against unforseen contingencies by express stipula-
tion . By analogy where the purchaser has contracted absolutely to 
pay the deposit (otherwise breach of a fundamental term) and defaulted , 
he cannot escape liability. The vendor would never have made the 
contract , if he had thought , that upon default the purchaser was to 
go free . 
I . . . h 60 1 n Monnigatti v. Mine en Ost er J . held that an action for an 
unpaid deposit was in substance distinct from one for damages . Much 
of the case was concerned with the doctrine of anticipatory breach . 
Ostler J. said:-
"But if in pursuance of the contract and while he is keeping alive money has become payable to him as a deposit or as an instalment of purchase- money , he may sue on the contract for the recovery of that money . Such an action is in no sense one for damages for breach of the contract , for there has been no breach accepted as such ; it is an action on the contract for a debt due thereunder. Now this is exactly what the first action was in this case . It was an action for the deposit which ought to have been paid ". 61 
If this is correct the action for the unpaid deposit is certainly 
Viable . However , Ostler J . indicates that this is subject to the 
Vendor "keeping (the contract) alive". It is unclear whether this 
·~ans the deposit is only recoverable before rescission or that after 
re scission de futuro the contract is alive in that the deposit is 
recoverable . If , and it is submitted Ostler J . referred to recovery 
S9. /1921} NZLR 115 , 116 
0 . /1937] ZLR 49 
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being available only before rescission, then it is respectfully 
contended to be incorrect. On this basis the vendor must, when the 
time for payment has passed, indicate his intention to sue for the 
unpaid deposit and rescind. The usual case will be that "by the 
terms of the agreement the defendant was bound to pay the 
purchase money ... without any conveyance at all ".62 
In Turner v. Bladin 63 it was said :-
"The consideration moving from the plaintiffs to the defendant was fully executed with the result that the defendantbecame 
indebted to the Plaintiffs for the balance of the purchase money and interest. An action to recover these sums would 
not be an action brought on the agreement but an action of 
indebitatus assumpsit". 
If this is correct it illustrates that the deposit may be 
recovered J~~µfS the contract or in the alternative the executed 
consideration straddles the concept and permits recovery on the 
contract itself. 
In New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co . Ltd v . Foster & 
Anor 64 in the context of a sale of land , where the deposit was paid 
by a promissory note endorsed by a third party , Chapman J . said :-
"There is no difference between paying a deposit and 
acknowledging a sum due as a deposit ". 
65 This is exemplified in Davidson v. Murphy whe re Pennefat~er J . 
held that a cheque given by a purchaser in payment of a cash d posit 
must be paid , although subsequently to its dishonour the purchaser 
discovered that at the time of sale the vendor had no title to a 
Portion of the land. This , it is submitted , is an example of the 
true nature of the deposit . It must be paid , it is owed to the 
Ve ndor unless he has not the ability to convey. The learned judge 
sta tes if the purchaser had simply omitted to pay the ~200 which was 
the deposit , the vendor :-
61. 
62. 
6 3 . 
At 52 
Laird v . Pim 7 M & w 474 per Parke B . 
(19 51) 8 2 CLR 4 6 3 , 4 7 4 LAW LIBRARY 
V CTORI UI , , CGSITY OF WELLI GTON 
- 24 -
" could have enforced payment of it if he could succeed in 
negotiating to purchase that part of the total land which 
he did not own". 
Analagously it can be reasoned that the unpaid deposit would 
have been enforced if he had a full good title when the payment of the 
cheque was stopped. 
One other illustrative case in the area of unpaid de9osits is 
Guildford Timber Co. Ltd v. Wright 66 . An agreement for the sale of 
certa in land contained a provision for payment contemporaneously 
with its execution a sum by way of deposit . On the respondent 
repudiating and failing to pay the deposit the learned magistrate 
held that payment of the deposit and conveyance being concurrent 
conditions , he was not entitled to sue independently of the 
execution of a conveyance. On appeal Ostler J. allowed the appeal 
and held that the appellant was not limited to the remedies provided 
for in the contract in the event of the respondents' default. 
In Johnson the table of vendors rights upon rescission was given 
"without prejudice to his other remedies . " A proviso of the Guildford 
contract stated that if the purchaser failed to comply the vendor 
could "enforce payment of all moneys payable under these presents, 
1n which case the whole of the purchase-money shall be deemed to have 
tecome due and payable to the vendor". 
Ostler J. said quite clearly 
"The contract provides that the deposit and the stamp duty 
shall be payable by respondent on the signing of the contract: they 
have not been paid, therefore they are debts which appellant company 
i s entitled to recover ." 
6 7 
66. (1930) NZLR 545. 
67. At 553 . 
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Earlier he said 68 · 
"A debt is a sum certain (sic) payable in respect of an 
immediate liability by a debtor to a creditor and immediately 
recoverable" ... 
It is submitted that this encompasses the unpaid deposit. 
Another interesting point is "was the deposit made?" In 
Mccully v Frampton & Mair 69 · the deposit payable was $1543. Only 
$1500 was paid. Roper J. stated in his lines that "what (the 
vendor) now seeks to do is make an unfair use of the letter of 
' his contract. But in Stembridge v Morrison the Court of Appeal 
were divided over ls. 6d! On appeal 70 · Mccully was reversed on 
another point. Cooke J. delivering the judgment of the Court 
s aid 
"(iv) There is much to be said for the view that failure 
to pay the deposit when due or in full would be fault .... we 
prefer not to express a concluded opinion on the deposit points." 
It is submitted that the deposit must be paid in full and 
promptly otherwise the omissions manifest themselves as an intention 
not to be bound by the contract. The vendor should be sued for 
t h . d 71. e unpai amount. 
68, At 552. 
69 . Unreported A 163/74 28 Feb. 1975 Christchurch S.C. Roper J. 
70 . (1976) INZLR 270. 
71. See Morrow Carty (1955) N.I. 174. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no emerging judicial trend of opinion on the question 
of the unpaid deposit. Only Lowe and Johnson refuse recovery. 
Only three cases have allowed recovery, yet seven others have 
wider statements to the effect that 1ecovery is the better 
course. The conclusions reached from an examination of the 
authorities are as follows:-
The unpaid deposit is recoverable as a debt. 
In New Zealand rescission is invariably de future, rescission 
ab initio preventing ex hypothesi any action for the unpaid 
deposit . A deposit is not a condition precedent to the 
formation of a contract unless the parties explicitly state 
that the unpaid deposit is recoverable as an unconditional right 
for which the parties have contracted independent of any 
conveyance . A dishonoured cheque or IOU provides a further 
cause of action for the payee. An unpaid deposit would only be 
a penalty if excessively large or oppressive. 
Johnson v Jones is incorrect. It relies on Lowe which 
is based on rescission ab initio. The right to the deposit was 
vested prior to rescission. The terms of the contract were 
"without prejudice'' to the vendors' other remedies. The deposit 
was recoverable as a debt. Many relevant authorities were not 
also to McMullin~cf especially Farrant which refused to follow 
Lowe . 
It is submitted that unless there is a specific clause 
to the contrary an unpaid deposit is recoverable. 
A _Ge_~_ar_d_?_cc_o~i t7 
August 1977 


